Corson v. Corson & Korn
No. ED109820
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court to Missouri Court of Appeals – Eastern District
Date Filed: 2/8/22
Trial Court Ruling Affirmed
E. Corson (hereinafter “Mother”) filed for divorce from J. Corson (hereinafter “Father”) on January 5, 2021. Father filed his Answer and Counterclaim on February 18, 2021. The parties settled their divorce and submitted a consent judgment to the Court on June 1, 2021.
On June 15, 2021 E. Korn, the maternal grandmother (hereinafter “Grandmother”), filed a motion to intervene in the Corson’s dissolution action based on Rule 52.12(a) and pursuant to RSMo. §452.402. Grandmother argued that she had an absolute right to intervene because the dissolution action was still pending. On June 16, 2021 Grandmother filed a Motion for Grandparent’s Right to Visitation. In her Motion, Grandmother alleged that Korn filed a verified Petition for Grandparent’s Rights in the dissolution action, alleging that she had been unreasonably denied visitation with the minor children since the parties’ separation. Mother argued against Grandmother’s Motion denying that she had unreasonably denied the children visitation with their grandmother and also noted that Grandmother’s motion was not timely filed. It is also important to note that on June 16, 2021 the Court signed and entered the Corson’s consent judgment.
On June 24, 2021 Grandmother filed a Motion to Set Aside the divorce judgment. The trial court heard arguments on July 15, 2021 and entered an order denying Grandmother’s request to intervene and set aside the divorce judgment.
Grandmother then appealed the trial court’s ruling. Grandmother’s primary argument was that the circuit court erroneously applied the law when it overruled her motion to intervene because § 452.402 provides an absolute right to intervene in a dissolution action so long as the action remains pending.
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Appellate opinion noted that “Under Rule 52.12(a), a litigant seeking intervention of right must demonstrate both a right to intervene and a timely filed application.” Frost v. White, 778 S.W.2d at 672. Furthermore, the Appellate Court held that:
[Grandmother] argues that her application for intervention was timely because she filed it before the circuit court entered the consent judgment. It is not entirely clear, however, that this assertion is accurate. [Grandmother] filed a motion to intervene at 5:44 pm on the day before the court entered its judgment. [Grandmother] then filed a document styled “Petition for Grandparent’s Rights” at 9:22 am on the day the circuit court entered its judgment. The judgment does not bear a timestamp, and the record does not otherwise suggest when it was entered. The motion itself was not heard or submitted until several weeks after entry of the judgment.
The Appellate Court also made it a point to note that while it is clear that §RSMo. 452.402 gives Grandmother the right to intervene in this particular situation, her petition was untimely.
Trial court ruling affirmed.
