Order of Protection Vacated Since No Harm or Fear of Harm Proven

L.M.M. v. J.L.G.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to Missouri Court of Appeals – Eastern District

ED 109013

Opinion Filed on March 23, 2021

L.M.M. filed an order of protection against her boyfriend’s sister, J.L.G. The two women have a contentious relationship. On December 18, 2019, L.M.M. filed an order of protection against J.L.G. In her petition, L.M.M. alleged that J.L.G. harassed, coerced and stalked her. J.L.G. would allegedly text L.M.M. up to 75 times a day and also repeatedly called and texted L.M.M.’s employer and made false accusations against her. Additionally, J.L.G. mocked L.L.M.’s appearance. L.M.M. expressed concern that J.L.G. would show up at her place of employment and attack her on social media.

During the contested hearing, L.M.M. testified that she her employer found J.L.G.’s behavior disruptive and she was worried about getting fired. Additionally, L.M.M. acknowledged that she and J.L.G. had engaged in contentious text message exchanges. Furthermore, L.M.M.’s friend, boyfriend and father all testified that J.L.G. had made unkind comments about L.M.M.’s appearance which she found distressing.

J.L.G. testified that she lived 300 miles away in Joplin, Missouri and had not seen L.M.M. since 2016. She acknowledged that she had engaged in contentious text message exchanges with L.M.M. However, she noted that since she had been served with an order of protection, she had not communicated or contacted L.M.M. and had no intention of doing so in the future. J.L.G. also testified she had contacted L.M.M.’s employment once regarding an unrelated matter.

The trial court granted L.M.M. a fully, one year order of protection against J.L.G. finding that she had proven her allegations of stalking against J.L.G.

J.L.G. appealed the trial court’s ruling on the grounds that her actions did not satisfy the definition of “stalking” under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act. Specifically, J.L.G. argued that there was “insufficient evidence to establish that she purposely and repeatedly engaged in an unwanted course of action that caused L.M.M. fear of physical harm.”

In its analysis, the Appellate Court noted that:

Stalking occurs when “any person purposely engages in an unwanted course of action that causes alarm to another person.” Section 455.010(14). In this context, “alarm” is defined as “to cause fear of danger of physical harm,” and “course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts over a period of time, however short, that serves no legitimate purpose” and may include following the other person, unwanted communication, or unwanted contact. Section 455.010(14)(a)-(b). Alarm has both a subjective and objective component, meaning that a person must subjectively fear the danger of physical harm and a reasonable person in the situation would likewise fear the danger of physical harm. E.D.H. v. T.J., 559 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). Where the petitioner does not present sufficient evidence that they fear physical harm or that a reasonable person would fear physical harm, an order of protection is not appropriate. See id.; see also K.L.M. v. B.A.G., 532 S.W.3d 706, 710-11 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).

The Appellate Court found that L.M.M. did not meet this particular burden. She never expressed that she actually feared that J.L.G. would harm her based on her their interactions. Emotional distress is not the same thing as fear. The Appellate opinion also noted that “the Adult Abuse Act is intended to prevent potential violence, not hurt feelings or harm to reputation.”

The Appellate opinion also note that L.M.M. did not meet the burden of establishing harassment that she raised in her order of protection petition. “Under the current statutory framework, however, abuse by harassment is now separate from stalking, and this Court has previously held that, because harassment is included only in the portion of the statute involving domestic violence, ‘[a]n order of protection based on abuse by harassment is available only to victims of domestic violence.’” P.D.J., 535 S.W.3d at 824. In this particular instance, L.M.M. was not a victim of domestic violence. As the sister of L.M.M.’s boyfriend, J.L.G. does not meet the definition of a “household member.”

Trial court’s judgment of granting a full order of protection is reversed and remanded.